CVE-2026-47065
Källa: security@apache.org
EXPLOTATION STATUS & MITIGATIONS
PÅVERKADE KLIENTER/MJUKVARA
BESKRIVNING
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
TEKNISK DATA
{
"id": "CVE-2026-47065",
"sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
"published": "2026-06-03T11:16:19.800",
"lastModified": "2026-06-03T11:16:19.800",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nWhen the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker \nfor a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()\n is\ndispatched. JDK then calls the default \nObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which \nperforms Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH \ninterface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted\n classes list .\n\n\nZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in \nreadClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nFor ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s \n (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an \nattacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the \ndeveloper wrote accept(“com.myapp.*\") , attacker supplies \ncom.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many \nreal-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers\n\n\nBoth issues have been fixed."
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Primary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-502"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyj",
"source": "security@apache.org"
}
]
}Status
Vector String
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H